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Printed and bound in the United States of America. Cognition) , the two of us imagined a conference that not only honored Pylyshyn's important work-work that still offers the best model for what can be called "classical cognitive science"-but work that would engage in dialogue with Pylyshyn as well. From the start we thought the idea of a festschrift for Pylyshyn to be less than perfect. Not because he was undeserving of delightful respect (he is), but because his views were, and are, far from fossilized. They were, and are, still infl uential as a real model of the way the mind might work. As Jerry Fodor argues, in the introduction to this book, Pylyshyn's recent work may well solve one of the fundamental problems and puzzles in cognitive science: how our minds are, after all, connected to the external world.
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Supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC), we organized a conference unoffi cially called "Zencon" at the University of Guelph, which is west of Toronto in Ontario. It took place April 29 to May 1, 2005. We brought together important cognitive scientists from a range of disciplines, and the conference, as with the book, was divided in a somewhat arbitrary way into contributions dealing either with vision or with the foundations of cognitive science. Some participants, such as Susan Carey and Brian Cantwell Smith, were not able to contribute to this volume. But consider those who have contributed: the philosophers Austen Clark, John Bickel, and Andrew Brook (invited to contribute, after the fact), all engage critically with Pylyshyn's work. Brian Keane, a philosopher converted (or converged) to cognitive science, mixes the conceptual with the empirical (we invited him too, after the conference). The neuroscientist Mel Goodale, a colleague-in-arms with Pylyshyn at the University of Western Ontario, and Stevan Harnad, the one-time, long-time editor of the journal Behavioral and Brain Sciences, write about cognition and action: the former from the perspective of vision, the latter from that of computation. Zenon's erstwhile student, Mike Dawson, has himself written important books on the foundations of cognitive science, and has an essay in this book about what connectionism might be used for. There is also an essay on the foundations of linguistics, by Charles Reiss. Reiss has been so impressed by Pylyshyn's work that he gave his son this middle name: Zenon. Claudia Uller, once a postdoctoral fellow at Rutgers Center for Cognitive Science, writes about number as it is understood by animals, human and otherwise, and Brian Scholl, another former student of Pylyshyn's, continues on with important work in the multipleobject tracking tradition, as does Lana Trick, while Richard Wright exploits Pylyshyn's infl uential ideas about cognitive penetrability in a paper dealing with visual search. (Trick and Wright, like Brook and Keane, did not present at Zencon.)
The conference, a great success, included posters by graduate students, a keynote address by Zenon, and a great deal of excellent argument and conversation. We hope the reader will fi nd this book, which is derived from those sessions, to be a valuable resource for thinking about computation, cognition, and Pylyshyn.
